The earlier quote by Gramsci continues as follows: "That all those Nietzschean charlatans in verbal revolt against all that exists, against conventionality, etc., should have ended up by accepting it after all, and have thus made certain attitudes seem quite unserious, may well be the case, but it is not necessary to let oneself be guided in one's own judgments by charlatans". In opposition to the unorganized and undirected refusal of unity, Gramsci posits "a need for 'sobriety' in words and external attitudes, precisely so that there should be more strength in one's character and concrete will" (PN 369). Without a will to express 'the unity of the human spirit', one "would not create new history, philosophies would not become ideologies and would not in practice assume the fanatical granite compactness of the 'popular beliefs" (PN 404, cf. 360). But on what historical basis could one say that a will to sameness, to an identity undisturbed by antagonistic otherness, is necessary? Or that the otherness that Vološinov sees as revolutionizing any group identity from within, is 'pathological'? And how can one distinguish (critically) between coherence and dispersion?
|p. 561||11.||Chomsky (1976: 128) criticizes Gramsci, because his point of view undermines the autonomy of the subject, on which Chomsky's political and linguistic theories are based. Chomsky considers freedom as an essential part of human nature. For this reason, he both revolted against the violations perpetrated on this essence in Vietnam, and left out such violations and everything social from his linguistics; this was one of the reasons for the social skewedness of most modern (socio-)linguistics.|